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Abstract 
In 2009, through its ‘No Compromise’ policy, UKSport allocated the last of its 
subsidies for the 2012 Summer Olympic funding cycle. The ‘No Compromise’ 
strategy allegedly targets ‘resources solely at those athletes/sports that are capable 
of delivering medal winning performances.’ While most Olympic sports saw 
significant increases in funding, the ‘rational’ nature of these funding decisions 
saw eight sports receive funding reductions of between 5% and 52%. This 
commitment to a ’No Compromise’ model has continued with the announcement 
of the Rio de Janeiro 2016 funding allocations, with some sport losing 100% of 
their UKSport funding for their elite programmes. In response, the ‘No 
Compromise’ policy has been challenged by those sports that received reductions. 
The aim of this research is to deconstruct the funding decisions and to challenge 
the consequences of the ‘No Compromise’ model. The research will begin to place 
these decisions within the wider political and ideological environment to expose 
patterns of inequality faced by the sports that received a reduction in funding. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the members of the management 
of two NGBs that received reduced levels of funding. This research paper seeks to 
achieve two objectives. The first is to determine the impacts of the funding 
decisions on the NGBs that received significant reductions in funding. The second 
objective examines how UKSport uses the ‘No Compromise’ funding regime to 
exert managerial control over NGBs. 
Key Words: Sport management, Olympics, funding, elite sport,  United Kingdom, 
governance, power. 
***** 
1. Funding and the National Governing Bodies of Sport
In 2006 UKSport, the body responsible for funding summer and winter 
Olympic elite level sports in the UK, adopted the ‘No Compromise’ approach to 
funding the National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs).1 As part of a clear 
prioritisation of elite sport, the funding strategy not only targeted ‘resources solely 
at those athletes/sports that are capable of delivering medal winning 
performances,’ but also enabled UKSport to withdraw funding from the Olympic 
funding cycle from those NGBs that failed to achieve performance targets.2 This 
occurred during the London 2012 funding cycle where eight Olympic sports saw 
their overall levels of funding reduced, even when several NGBs actually achieved 
their targets. The funding mechanism has continued into the Rio de Janeiro 2016 
This chapter originally appeared in Dunn, S. Spracklen, K. Wise, N. (eds) Game Changer: The 
Transformative Potential of Sport, 2014 first published by the Inter-Disciplinary Press
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funding cycle and has created a new relationship between UKSport and the NGBs, 
one based on resource-dependency, where if the sport achieves specific targets they 
will in principle receive their funding.3 As UKSport and the NGBs move into Rio 
de Janeiro 2016 Olympic funding cycle, which has seen the UK Government invest 
an unprecedented £283.6m into elite able bodied sport, nine NGBs saw their 
funding allocation from UKSport cut from between 9.3% and 100%.4   
When deciding on these funding levels UKSport employed the ‘No 
Compromise’ funding strategy to rationalise the decisions they made in terms of 
reducing the funding allocated to nine of the NGBs. However, if the ‘No 
Compromise’ model is based on NGBs achieving performance based objectives, 
why did several sports receive significant reductions in funding when their 
objectives were met? The NGBs felt the process lacked transparency and the 
funding decisions have consequently damaged their ability to meet future 
performance based targets because they lack the resources to effectively create 
sport development pathways for their elite athletes.  Richard Callicott, Chairman of 
the British Volleyball Federation, stated:   
 
To all intents and purposes this decision shows that despite how 
well we have done, UKSport cannot see the significant progress 
we have made from a standing start… I dispute their argument 
that we don’t have the talent to win medals, what we don’t have 
is the programme and how are we supposed to put that in place 
without any funding.5 
 
UKSport made the funding decision to reduce volleyball’s funding by nearly 
90% based on the perception that the sport would find it extremely challenging to 
achieve medals at future Olympics, even though volleyball had actually achieved 
their minimum performance target. Table tennis also met their performance targets, 
but still saw their funding reduced by 100% (See table 1). What made this decision 
making process even less transparent is fencing, water polo and weightlifting 
received a funding increase without meeting their performance targets, with water 
polo seeing 55.1% increase in their funding.6 The NGBs that received funding 
reductions struggled to understand why their funding had been significantly 
reduced, particularly as one of the principle objectives of the London 2012 games 
was to achieve a sporting legacy. Chris McDermott, a British Handball Olympic 
Player, stated: 
 
I think the whole tag and mantra of the Games was ‘legacy,’ and 
handball has shown we’re capable of producing a legacy. In 
England, participation in the sport has quadrupled since the 
Olympic Games. If you take away the elite end, what do these 
kids have to aspire towards?7 
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The drive to create a more performance driven elite sport programme is not 
something new, and is not exclusive to the UK. Stell’s work, in this volume, 
identifies that as countries began to monitor the outcomes (social impacts and 
legacy) of major events, such as the Olympics and Commonwealth games, the 
dominant discourse surrounding the rationale and support for these events was 
altered – particularly from an economic and political perspective. Tendai Chari, 
also in this volume, notes that sports which society deems to be culturally 
significant and have a high degree of perceived importance within the media will 
create a discourse of ‘practical and symbolic significance’ whereby institutions will 
support these sports above and beyond others. While the targeting of funds at 
‘performing’ sports in the UK has been applied since the inception of the ‘No 
Compromise’ policy, the sport performance aspect is not the only criteria in terms 
of deciding who receives funding – there is also is a ‘cultural criteria’ as well.8 
With the UK re-aligning their funding mechanism and South Africa focusing on 
sports that ‘society’ deems to be culturally significant, both countries carry a risk 
of creating a more homogenous sporting landscape where government agencies, 
such as UKSport, will decide which sports are acceptable through their allocation 
of funding.9 
 
Table 1: 
Comparison of UKSport Olympic Funding: Beijing 2008 and London 201210 
Sport  Funding 
for   
Beijing 
2008    
(£m) 
Targets 
Achieved 
in  
Beijing? 
Funding 
for  
London  
2012 
(£m) 
%  
Change  
in  
funding 
Targets  
Achieved 
in 
London  
2012? 
Funding  
for  
Rio  
2016  
(£m) 
%  
Change  
in  
funding 
Table tennis 2.53 No 1.21 -52.2 Yes 0 -100 
Wrestling 2.13 No 1.43 -32.9 No 0 -100 
Handball 2.99 N/A 2.92 -3.0 No 0 -100 
Volleyball  4.11 N/A 3.54 -14.7 Yes~ 0.514 -89 
Archery 2.83 No 4.4 +55.5 No 3.13 -28.9 
Badminton 8.8 No 7.4 -15.1 No 5.9 -20.5 
Swimming 20.6 Yes 25.14 +23.9 No 21.4 -15.1 
Basketball 3.7 Partial 8.6 +132.8 No 7.04 -18.1 
Judo 6.94 No 7.48 +7.7 Yes 6.8 -9.3 
Diving 5.87 No 6.54 +11.1 Yes 7.46 +17.5 
Shooting 5.06 No 2.46 -51.5 Yes 2.99 +21.6 
Fencing 3.07 Yes 2.53 -18 .0 No 3.08 +21.9 
Weightlifting 1.68 Yes 1.36 -19.3 No 1.79 +31.7 
Equestrian 11.72 No 13.39 +14.1 Yes 17.92 +33.9 
Water polo 3.5 N/A 2.9 -7.8 No 4.54 +55.1 
~maximum expectations were not meet however 
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2.  The Olympic Funding Cycle and New Public Management 
The changes to the funding criteria, elite sports policy and the governance of NGBs 
have clearly been influenced by the concepts and principles of ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM). Through the NPM policy, UK central government has 
sought to place greater emphasis on managerial improvement within government 
agencies, such as UKSport, by giving them greater autonomy through a 
decentralised approach. Although this decentralised process has given UKSport 
access to higher levels of resource, it in turn expects the NGBs that it funds to 
adopt a more market based approach to management with a clear focus on 
efficiency and effectiveness. .11 This approach has been described as a ‘good 
managerial approach’. Moreover, market approaches are results orientated, 
focusing on efficiency, effectiveness and service quality, in addition to placing 
higher levels of accountability on the NGBs that receive funding. This 
accountability is assessed by UKSport through a measure of whether the NGBs had 
achieved their criteria in terms of ‘good management’ and winning Olympic 
medals. With this ‘simplified’ measure of performance now in place, a key 
criticism of NPM becomes apparent as the NGBs actually face complex objectives 
because they meet the needs of more intricate accountabilities, while still lacking 
the degree of freedom that many market based organisations have.12 While this 
approach will generate greater autonomy within the NGBs, in terms of how they 
respond to the changes in funding, the increased freedom may actually result in 
responses that favour certain groups and are detrimental to others.13 The concept of 
inclusive/exclusive discourse, noted by Chari, is important to acknowledge here 
because certain groups will benefit from these funding decisions at the expense of 
others. With sport in the UK becoming more dependent on central government 
funding, this being a resource dependent relationship, the NGBs will see a shift in 
their relationship with key stakeholders – including amateur and elite athletes, 
coaches, administrative staff, volunteers and board members. This change in 
relationship between the NGBs and its stakeholders will see the focus of the NGBs 
accountability shifting from its stakeholders, to meeting the needs and wants of 
UKSport – meaning that groups, such as minority groups, can be bypassed with no 
recourse, as long as the sports targets are met. Ultimately the funding bodies 
maintain the power to decide who is included rather than the actual stakeholders 
within the NGBs.14 If a new strategy is to prove successful, then effective 
governance systems need to ensure that the decision making process is transparent, 
engaging and represents the interest of all stakeholders rather than just those in 
positions of power.15 
To move in a new strategic direction and to meet the challenges of ‘No 
Compromise,’ NGBs need to ensure that the strategy is not only harmonious with 
their stakeholders’ interests, but also meets their responsibilities to central 
government and UKSport.16 Painter argues that ‘most areas of public service and 
administration have distinct political, ethical, constitutional and social dimensions’ 
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that render it different from the private sector.17 Indeed, an argument can be made 
that NPM may not be applicable to public sector organisations, nor should it be 
seen as a superior benchmark for NGBs as their managers will have to deliver 
‘non-market’ objectives.18 A loss of accountability to stakeholders can result in 
what is described as a ‘democratic deficit.’19 If NGBs do not implement a 
governance system that can monitor their new strategy and control their new 
strategic direction, they may see a further reduction in funding through the 
intervention of UKSport, as well as come into conflict with their stakeholders.20 
This may prove to be problematic, especially as government influenced sport 
policies such as the ‘No Compromise’ funding model in the UK and the 
government’s financial support of the South Africa World Cup have led to 
dramatic shifts in sports policy. This shift will likely focus on short term benefits, 
such as winning medals and national pride, rather than long term investments in 
each sport – something which certain sports with complex development schemes 
and low participation levels need.21 
 
3. Power Relations and Governance 
To further understand power relations and governance, with the creation of ‘No 
compromise’ it could be argued that UKSport are seeking re-align the 
meaning/mission of the NGBs from that of regulatory bodies to organisations that 
have a stronger focus on elite athlete development. UKSport is exerting power on 
the NGBs by seeking to control outcomes.22 Chari acknowledged this as a source 
of contention when discussing the Football World Cup held in South Africa. The 
narrative portrayed was the event was a ‘Pan-African project for everyone of 
continental Africa.’ Although the narratives within both situations are seeking to 
create a dominate discourse, the desire to control the outcomes could be 
problematic as the new discourse may actually construct clearer paths of 
criticism.23 For example, Chari identifies clear criticisms of the South African 
World Cup because it failed to integrate its immigrant Zimbabwean population into 
the event – which resulted in many of them leaving the country. UKSport’s use of 
statistical evidence to define success could be problematic as their measure of 
success is more tangible, actually making it easier for all stakeholders to not only 
criticise the performance of the NGBs, but UKSport as well. Both examples show 
that rationalising funding decisions will marginalise certain groups, while 
promoting others. In the case of UKSport, by creating a funding model that is 
based on rewarding achievement, they are seeking to legitimise a nascent discourse 
within sport that is allowed to penalise NGBs that do not achieve their targets.24 
As the NGBs adapt to the changes imposed on them by their funding reductions 
the values, ideas and beliefs that underpin these organisations will come under 
pressure from not only key stakeholders within the organisations but also from 
other government agencies such UKSport, Sport England and the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).25 However, the NGBs will not necessarily be 
Funding UK Elite Sport through the ‘No Compromise’ Policy  
__________________________________________________________________ 
6 
focused on short term solutions to halt their decline in performance. This is 
because management decisions usually seek to preserve the organisational ‘status 
quo,’ which can result in the values and structures that facilitated the decline not 
being challenged. Subunits within the organisation will seek to exert influence and 
authority to protect themselves from the perceived negatives of change, rather than 
seeking performance improvement.26 These problems can be exacerbated within 
NGBs as they balance the development of elite athletes and the need to increase 
grassroots participation rates within their own sport.27 This could have the effect of 
distorting the NGBs aims and strategies because of the conflicting objectives. 
However, this drive to improve elite level performance is the key rationale for its 
increased level of funding as it is seen that improved elite performance, in terms of 
the amount of medals won, will actually drive mass participation.28 Chari identified 
similar issues within the South African World Cup, where the rationale for funding 
this mega event was to provide a legacy of increased participation. However, an in-
depth analysis suggests there is little evidence to support the viewpoint that 
funding elite sport and mega sport events actually have grassroots sport 
participation benefits.29 Funding is often redirected to elite sport and mega sport 
events because ‘self-interested actors’ control the strategic direction of sport within 
the given country and seek to not only control the resource base for sport, but to 
actually enforce these funding decisions.30 This is why ‘power relations’ are so 
important in the study of organisational change and decision making. All 
stakeholders that have a direct interest in the NGBs will engage in political 
manoeuvring – with the intent of persuading any opposing parties not to challenge 
these decisions by creating strategies, forming alliances or resisting decisions.31 
Dowding explains that the power relationships that exist between and within 
organisations, the NGBs and UKSport in this case, need to be analysed so that the 
actions of individuals/groups can be explained and put into context.32, If we adopt 
a more critical perspective, Alvesson and Deetz would argue that the funding 
allocations made by UKSport and the response by the NGBs, in the long run will 
largely serve those in positions of power.33 Consequently, this move to rewarding 
performance (medals) could be seen as being beneficial to these individuals/groups 
that have been achieving their performance targets. By using critical approaches, 
researchers seek to understand and address the perceived inequalities in the 
funding allocations by empowering the actors involved to make sense and 
understand what is happening around them.34 It has been suggested that sport 
reproduces ‘status quos’ within society, to the extent it is fundamentally affected 
by social relations and political environments.35 If this is the case then the funding 
decisions of UKSport and indeed the reaction of the NGBs will bring into question 
key issues surrounding the concept of governance. Governance will determine 
where funding is allocated, and as a result certain groups will be marginalised and 
others promoted. While there is a host of literature focusing on governance, there is 
little that has been applied to strategy formulation within NGBs.36 Governance 
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issues are often at the forefront of debates, especially when the NGBs go through 
processes of change. Therefore, effective management is essential if change is to 
be realised. With the NGBs working with reduced levels of income, what 
constitutes an appropriate form of governance has been questioned. Clearly, the 
NGBs will be experiencing pressure to increase revenue generation, attract higher 
membership numbers and produce world class athletes. At the same time NGBs are 
being required to adopt practices more akin to a ‘business’ model of operations to 
prevent further reductions in their funding allocation.37 Governance has therefore 
become a critical component of the effective management of sport organisations, 
particularly those funded by UKSport.38 
Through the measures that are being imposed on the NGBs ‘No Compromise’ 
Competence Framework, UKSport is attempting to exert control, so that ultimately 
NGBs act in a manner that is intrinsically linked to UKSport’s own aims and 
objectives.39 The goal of UKSport is to achieve the maximum amount of medals 
from their investment, while the NGBs must contend with the interests and 
viewpoints of multiple stakeholders, including amateur and elite athletes, coaches, 
sponsors, volunteers and board members. It is apparent that these methods of 
‘constraint’ have been adopted so that the NGBs (the agent) act in the interests of 
UKSport (the principal) rather than their own – a key tenet of principal agent 
theory of governance. Spear identifies key external factors such as government 
influence and the drive towards the professionalization of managers (as can be seen 
through UKSport’s NPM agenda) as tilting power towards the managers, out of the 
hands of stakeholders.40  Spear goes on to state that this model of governance, 
ignores individual members, due to performance measures placed on them and 
therefore marginalises ‘collective, social or organizational factors…it tends to 
ignore non-financial motivations such as common values, shared benefits and 
trust.’41 Walters, Tacon and Trenberth argue that NGBs need to become much 
better at identifying the intensions of their stakeholders, noting ‘all NGBs should 
bring key stakeholders to the board/committee to improve stakeholder 
representation.’42  
While NGBs are able to access additional sources of finance such as 
sponsorship, the one-way nature of the relationship between the UKSport and the 
NGBs create an inherent problem for governance. NGBs are required to act in a 
certain manner, which potentially means they could bypass the interests of their 
own stakeholders to achieve funding.43 Democratic theory is an alternative view of 
governance that sees the NGBs stakeholders as a group of culturally interconnected 
individuals, who share common norms and values.44 A key characteristic of this 
model is that through its methods of representation, it allows for greater 
transparency in decision making through engagement with organisational members 
and stakeholders. However, unless the democratic model can engage at both the 
internal and external level, the organisations that employ it are more concerned 
with how engagement and democracy can be institutionalised through practices 
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within the NGBs.45 A more critical perspective on organisational governance 
would seek to challenge this status quo and question how these democratic 
processes came about, how they were selected and whether they serve the interests 
of one particular group.46 A critical approach would ask whether the decision-
making process would be enhanced if the NGBs were actively engaged and 
consulted with before their level of funding was determined by UKSport. 
However, as we move into the Rio de Janeiro 2016 funding cycle, it seems that this 
top-down form of governance and management will continue. This will leave the 
NGBs having little opportunity to consult over their funding allocations or to 
influence decisions in sport policy formulation.47 
Research within the field of sport management is often based on improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of sport organisations. Little emphasis is placed on 
who these improvements are designed for, or their possible consequences and 
outcomes. From a governance perspective UKSport developed the ‘Competencies 
Framework’ because most of the NGBs lacked governance systems to ensure 
‘transparency, financial controls, and monitoring and reporting.’48 While this drive 
to create a more effective governance framework should not be dismissed, 
Habermas identifies two key critical issues. First, while these targets maybe 
viewed as rational by NGBs management, other stakeholders may understand this 
rhetoric differently. There is simply no objective truth about the NGBs governance 
obligations. Secondly, the relative ability of the NGBs to implement this structure 
modelled on the Competencies Framework would be based on the rhetorical and 
resource ability of the NGB concerned.49 What this means is that any engagement 
with stakeholders in the governance process will actually be distorted. Although it 
may be observed to be in good faith, it could actually be an act of coercion to meet 
the criteria set down by UKSport.50 Noland and Philips go on to state that ‘moral 
engagement is marked by specific conditions of communication which ensure that 
the communication is uncorrupted by power differences and strategic 
motivations.’51 The issue here is that the criteria set out by UKSport make 
uncorrupted communication almost impossible. 
 
4. Method 
Central to this research is the generation of a legitimate account of how the 
funding reductions have affected the NGBs.52 Silverman believes that legitimate 
accounts can be achieved through in-depth interviews with the actors involved.53 
To generate the data, semi-structured interviews involving in-depth discussions 
focusing on key themes and questions were conducted with representatives from 
Olympic NGBs. Interviews are a type of data collection where the researcher has 
the opportunity to gather knowledge that is not available elsewhere.54 For the 
purpose of this study, conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives 
from two NGBs has allowed the researcher to further understand the impacts that 
funding reductions have had on their programmes. By engaging with the 
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participants so they can evaluate the impacts of the funding reductions, this study 
will assess the implications of the change programme on the organizations 
concerned. The researcher will use the key themes of organisational power, 
governance and change as a general guide for the interview so as to eliminate 
distortion and create a consensus of opinion between the actors involved. Under 
the semi-structured interview process, additional probing questions were asked to 
obtain supplemental detail needed to answer the research question.55 Probing 
questions further enable researchers to ‘home in’ on topics of relevance to the 
research agenda.56 Bourdieu supports this notion of the process of interviewing by 
stating:  
 
…this craft is a real ‘disposition to pursue truth’, which enables 
one to improvise on the spot, in the pressing situation of the 
interview, strategies of self-presentation and adaptive responses, 
encouragement and opportune questions, etc., in such a manner 
as to help the research respondent give up her truth or, rather, to 
be delivered to her truth.57  
 
As noted above, semi-structured interviews were conducted with two current 
chief executives of Olympic NGBs to allow a comparative case study approach. 
Purposive sampling was chosen to select these NGBs because it was important to 
identify and select organisations that had received significant reductions in funding 
for the London 2012 funding cycle and had experienced negative consequences as 
a result. 58 As a result of this sampling method the two NGBs were selected. To 
justify the reasoning for narrowing the focus of this research to these two sports, 
the first NGBs was selected because they received a 52.3% reduction in funding 
for London 2012, resulting from targets not being met in Beijing 2008. Although 
this NGBs actually met their targets for London 2012, their funding for Rio de 
Janeiro 2016 saw a 100% reduction. The second NGBs experienced a 18% 
reduction in funding for London 2012 when their targets were not met in Beijing. 
Although this NGBs did not meet their targets during London 2012 they actually 
received a 22.5% increase for the Rio de Janeiro funding cycle. 
 
5. Case Studies Analysis of the Two NGBs  
With UKSport adopting the ‘No Compromise’ funding model, the NGBs have 
had to change their daily operations and structure. This point is further reinforced 
by several authors, who argue there are a number of structure related issues 
surrounding NGBs.59 Now that the criteria for funding is focused on performance, 
the NGBs will be inclined to direct more resources (i.e. funding and coaching) 
towards athletes who will hit performance targets now, rather than focusing on the 
long-term development of younger athletes. Consequently, the respondents felt the 
funding decisions have impacted upon not only the organisational structure of their 
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NGB, but also upon its culture and mind set.60 Both respondents were of a similar 
view that performance had to be rewarded, but the representative from the first 
NGBs noted there also needed to be investment: 
   
Well I understand the model perfectly and the ruthless ‘No 
Compromise’ approach to high performance is right. You don’t 
dilute excellence. However, the issue with it is that at some point 
there has to be an element of investment in a programme as 
opposed to purely rewarding a programme. Where will long-term 
investment come from?  
 
When analysing the interview responses regarding the impact of the ‘No 
Compromise’ funding model, it can be argued they are the result of the 
participating NGBs being forced to adopt a more professional approach to their 
activities. This has resulted in the NGBs aligning themselves more closely with the 
private sector as opposed to remaining closely aligned with the voluntary sector. 
Consequently, based on the data collected for this research, different values are 
now emerging within at least some sporting NGBs.61 Changes in culture influences 
the values and beliefs of some  organisation and daily operations and arguably the 
traditional perceived role of NGBs within UK sport.62 In supporting this 
perspective, the representative of the second NGBs mentioned:   
 
If funding is going to be linked more and more to performance 
and medals, then the elite guys need to be supported. It’s 
incredibly tough to win medals – that is why the focus needs to 
be on high performance.  
 
As the NGBs adapt to the changes imposed on them by their funding reductions 
the values, ideas and beliefs that underpin these organisations will come under 
pressure from not only key stakeholders within the organisations but also 
UKSport.63 The responsibility of adopting professional practices extolled by 
UKSport and a more intensive drive to gain additional commercial sponsorship is 
now considered an essential element in the role of the NGBs interviewed, and is 
arguably symptomatic of other NGBs within UK sport. However, Steen-Johnsen 
and Vidar Hanstad identified this as creating a dilution of purpose within 
Norwegian NGBs, who have little skill, ability or inclination to engage with the 
private sector because it distorts the NGBs aims and objectives and distracts them 
from their main purpose of representing and governing their specific sport.64  
The concept of control as a function of management through their relationship 
with UKSport was a key theme identified when analysing the interview data.  For 
example, as a result of the drive to professionalise the NGBs, they have had to 
become more business-like (private sector ethos) in their approach to managing 
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their organisations by showing higher levels of accountability. NGBs that are not 
bound by funding mechanisms not linked to performance targets are generally in a 
better position to answer the needs and demands of their own internal stakeholders, 
such as athletes, coaches and clubs. When this relationship moves to one of 
resource dependency, the organisation providing the resources can exert greater 
demands over the NGBs and generally ignore other stakeholders.65 One particular 
pressure that UKSport was exerting over the NGBs was the drive away from their 
amateur footing to one where the representative of the second NGBs saw a greater 
role for the professional: 
 
We needed to show UKSport that we were not only accountable 
for the money they gave us, but we also needed to show that we 
ran our organisation in a professional manner. The board 
committee needed to change and be put on a more professional 
footing. That is why we recruited Alex Newton (performance 
director) to show UKSport we were serious about winning 
medals, and showing a return on their investment. Within this 
role, we wanted the new performance director to move our 
athletes away from an amateur footing to a more professional, 
business like mentality. 
 
It is clear that due to the massive reductions in funding the NGBs have to 
respond effectively and quickly as there is a danger that they won’t be able to 
deliver future Olympic development programmes. As a result, both of these NGBs 
have changed their existing strategies to try and meet these demands, though in 
completely different ways. The first NGBs has adopted a strategy whereby they 
move away from the use of voluntary staff and embrace a more ‘professional’ 
structure to meet the demands of UKSport. The second NGB sees the four-year 
funding cycle as entirely problematic as they need ‘a triple Olympic funding cycle 
(12rs) of sustained investment’ because of the time scales involved in the 
development of their elite athletes. This is because the development of elite 
athletes within sports that require 'complex skills' sets, require a higher degree of 
investment in terms of time, funding and coaching. Whilst there are no rigid 
guidelines to successfully implement ‘turnaround’ strategies, many researchers 
have supported Mordaunt and Cornforth’s assumptions that long-term stable 
investment is a key factor for an organisation to improve performance.66 With such 
a drastic reduction in funding, the first NGBs representative feels that their 
organisation warrants drastic changes in direction: 
 
The funding reductions have destroyed moral, expertise and I 
think we have got to take it into our own hands to try and get the 
sustained support that is required…I just think we have got to 
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take our destiny into our own hands… and place greater 
emphasis on the club structure and somehow attract money into 
the sport and keep going. Grow the sport until we can generate 
enough financial resource and grow clubs up to the level where 
they can actual deliver more world class performers.  
 
Both NGBs have adopted strategies to try and ‘turnaround’ their performance 
decline. Turnaround, in the context of the NGBs, are the operational decisions the 
organisation takes to halt a decline in organisational performance and the strategic 
choices taken to ensure a move to acceptable performance.67 To enact an 
operational and strategic reversal the NGBs have chosen a clearer focus on 
developing a professional structure and a drive to create a stronger club system.  
However, while senior management teams of the NGB seek to implement this new 
turnaround strategy and seem able to manage the influence of key stakeholders, the 
nadir of the incident (the funding decisions) seems to be completely out of their 
control or influence.68 This means that these NGBs are unlikely to be able to 
reverse their decline, because they do not have the stable investments needed for 
the development of their sport. 
As the NGBs begin to respond, adapt and change to the funding reductions 
enforced upon them, the managerial and leadership skills of the CEOs have been 
placed under increased ‘pressure’ to meet future performance targets. However, 
both representatives interviewed felt that there was uncertainty as to whether they 
would receive their funding allocation even if they achieved their performance 
targets and a perception that some sports had a distinct advantage in achieving their 
goals. What accounts for these differences in perceptions is called the ‘shadow-
side,’ where many of the leadership and management decisions take place but do 
not get identified, discussed or managed in the public domain.69 So while the 
achievement of medal targets is an objective measure of performance, the decision 
making process behind the level of funding received by the NGBs has been 
obscure. Although the representatives interviewed are entirely pragmatic about the 
funding levels, they still see an element of unfairness in the process: 
 
When we received our reduced level of funding we didn’t see 
comparable levels of reduction in other sports. We could see that 
certain money has gone into basketball which doesn't have the 
same incredible detailed sophisticated systems that we have in 
terms of our organisation. What we tried not to get into was 
saying ‘how come they got more and we got less’ it’s not our 
business but it just seemed unfair that we were being targeted. 
 
To try and make sense of the impacts of the funding decisions, the concept of 
the ‘shadow-side’ can be linked to the concept of power through the application of 
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Lukes three-dimensional model.70 The first dimension, overt, at its core is seen as 
behaviourist – suggesting acts of power are observable.71 In this regard, the CEOs 
of the NGBs are fully aware that if they fail to reach their medal target they will 
receive a significant reduction in their funding. Moreover, they understand the 
decision making process, but the key weakness here is that there is a clearly a 
difference between the rhetoric of UKSport and their decision because this 
dimension does not explain the discrepancy in funding levels. The second 
dimension (covert), is where power is exercised behind closed doors and where the 
decision making process can be manipulated or influenced by those that have the 
power to the set the agenda, whilst excluding those that do not have power. This 
dimension may explain why there is a discrepancy in funding levels, but does not 
explain why the NGBs seem resigned to accepting the funding allocations. Lukes’ 
third dimension (ambivalence to being dominated) occurs when those with power 
have the ability to shape opinions to reflect the views of those in power, and more 
importantly those that are being controlled are acquiesce in their response. This 
compliance occurs at two levels, one where the groups actually believe the values 
which oppress them, or this as in this research, they are resigned to the decision as 
there is simply no alternative.72 
The hierarchical chain of power from government down to NGBs has 
effectively coerced the NGBs into delivering a narrow, Olympic-driven sports 
policy to meet governmentally set targets. This restricts the NGBs in terms of the 
time they have for other activities and may lead to a decline in their sports. Indeed, 
Spear found that what normally happens in NGBs that become more reliant on 
professional staff, is that volunteers, coaches and club officials are bypassed during 
the making of key decisions and as a consequence leave the NGBs.73 This in turn 
creates a knowledge ‘vacuum’ with an actual decline in the number of people in 
the NGB who have an intimate knowledge of the sport.74 It is observed that this has 
begun to happen in the NGBs researched, for instance: 
 
The organisation was not run by professionals, so a key issue 
was to try and ‘remove’ the amateurs that held sway. Without 
their removal it would have been almost impossible for us to 
adopt a more professional footing – we had to start to think more 
like a business. 
 
Spear identifies UKSport’s external drive towards professionalisation of the 
NGBs as tilting power towards the managers, out of the hands of stakeholders.75 
Spear also goes on to state that if there is a concentration of professional staff 
(paid), volunteers will be ignored because the professional organisations ‘tend to 
ignore non-financial motivations such as common values, shared benefits and trust 
due to performance measures placed on them.’76 Walters, Tacon and Trenberth 
support this viewpoint by arguing that NGBs need to better identify their 
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stakeholders and ‘should bring key stakeholders to the board/committee to improve 
stakeholder representation.’77 With UKSport directing NGBs to act in a 
performance, professionally orientated manner, there is little incentive to engage in 
this process and stakeholders will most likely continue to be marginalised. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Some key conclusions drawn from the research suggest that the ‘No 
Compromise’ funding system has created a new power relationship between 
UKSport and the NGBs. At the heart of this relationship is UKSport’s desire to 
coerce the NGBs into delivering much more focused Olympic-driven programmes 
to meet medal targets. Relating this study back to Stell’s work, she notes that a 
narrow focus on world class performance targets is likely to continue as 
performance expectations from all stakeholders will only increase. Indeed, the 
concept of performance within the Olympic Games is only likely to become more 
centred on the analysis of comparative medal tables. The consequence of the focus 
on winning medals is that it alienates stakeholders such as volunteers, which means 
the professional staff have less resources to address the factors behind the sport’s 
general decline because of the focus on elite athletes. The resource dependent 
nature of the relationship with UKSport means that the NGBs that received funding 
cuts need to decide if their organisation can achieve its targets by continuing with 
its existing strategy. However, with reduced resources resulting from severe 
funding cuts they may warrant the need for a drastic change in direction.78 With 
UKSport showing a clear commitment to the ‘No Compromise’ funding model 
following the allocations of funding for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de 
Janeiro, the management of the NGBs are extremely limited in their options. 
Unless the funding mechanisms change after 2016, the narrow focus of short-term 
medal targets on which UKSport judge the performance of the NGBs may actually 
force them to adopt practices that may well bring short-term gains. The adopted 
practices almost counter-intuitively put the long-term development and success of 
sports that receive funding reductions in jeopardy. 
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